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Abstract—Key establishment is one fundamental issue in wire-
less security. The widely used Diffie-Hellman key exchange is
vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack. This paper presents
a novel in-band solution for defending the man-in-the-middle
attack during the key establishment process for wireless devices.
Our solution is based on the insight that an attacker inevitably
affects the link layer behavior of the wireless channel, and this
behavior change introduced by the attacker can be detected by
the legitimate users. Specifically, we propose a key exchange
protocol and its corresponding channel access mechanism for
the protocol message transmission, in which the Diffie-Hellman
parameter is transmitted multiple times in a row without being
interrupted by other data transmission on the same wireless
channel. The proposed key exchange protocol forces the MITM
attacker to cause multiple packet collisions consecutively at the
receiver side, which can then be monitored by the proposed
detection algorithm. The performance of the proposed solution is
validated through both theoretical analysis and simulation: the
proposed solution is secure against the MITM attack and can
achieve an arbitrarily low false positive ratio. This proposed link
layer solution works completely in-band, and can be easily imple-
mented on off-the-shelf wireless devices without the requirement
of any special hardware.
Index Terms—Diffie-Hellman; device pairing; in-band; MITM
attack; link layer defense
I. INTRODUCTION
With the explosive growth of mobile devices, wearable
sensors, smart home appliances, and many other Internet of
things, people are living in a world of wirelessly connected
devices. Securing the data communication between these wire-
less devices is of critical importance, especially when sensitive
personal data is involved. Cryptographic solutions can be
implemented to protect the data communication, however, how
to distribute the cryptographic key in the first place is a
nontrivial task. It is known that the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
agreement allows two parties with no pre-shared knowledge
to jointly establish a shared secret key over the public channel
[1]. Although the DH protocol is secure against eavesdroppers,
its lack of mutual authentication makes it vulnerable to the
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. The typical approach to
address the MITM attack is to execute a device pairing
protocol which usually utilizes an out-of-band (OoB) channel,
and the utilization of the OoB channel inevitably involves
human interactions [2]. Besides the inconvenience brought
by the human efforts, the utilization of the OoB channels is
also restricted by the requirement of certain user interfaces or
device hardware, such as a keyboard or screen. With all these
limitations of the OoB channel, it is of significant importance
to seek in-band solutions for the initial trust establishment
between wireless devices.
The necessity of the OoB channel in a device pairing
protocol is related to the Dolev-Yao attack model [3], in
which an attacker has full control of the channel and can
overhear, intercept, and synthesize any message. However,
in a realistic wireless network, an attacker cannot arbitrarily
modify an ongoing signal transmission, nor can he cancel
the wireless signal propagation [4]. This realistic adversary
model gives people an opportunity to design an in-band
solution to deal with the MITM attack during the key exchange
process. There have been a few attempts for the in-band
device pairing [5]–[7]. The ideas of these works are based
on the I-Code technique [4], which can protect the integrity
of a message payload by modulating the message signal
with Manchester coded ON/OFF keying. There are two major
limitations of this type of solutions. First, although the I-
Code technique protects the integrity of the protocol messages
from being modified by the MITM attacker, it cannot prevent
an impersonation attacker. To provide authentication, OoB
channels are inevitably involved. For example, [5] uses the
WiFi push button configuration (PBC), which requires the user
to physically click the button on the device. However, the
proposed link layer solution can deal with the impersonation
attack using only in-band channels (discussed in section VII).
Second, the I-Code technique requires modification to the
physical layer signal modulation method, which is not easy
to be implemented on off-the-shelf wireless devices. Our link
layer method only requires minimal adjustment on the link
layer protocol stack.
The insight of our solution is based the link layer behav-
ior monitorability of a wireless channel, i.e., the attacker’s
behavior inevitably impacts the wireless channel behavior at
the link layer, and this link layer behavior change can be
observed by legitimate users. Specifically, to launch the MITM
attack, an attacker has to replace the original message with his
own. Because an attacker cannot arbitrarily modify an ongoing
wireless message, he has to intercept the original message and
forge a new one. However, since the attacker cannot cancel
the signal propagation of the original message, in order to
intercept it, the best he can do is to transmit a jamming signal
to collide the original message such that the receiver cannot
decode it. This message collision introduced by the attacker
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
09
52
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
8 J
an
 20
19
is perceptible to the legitimate receiver.
In this paper, we will exploit this link layer behavior
monitorability property of the wireless channel to design a
novel in-band solution to deal with the MITM attack. To
achieve this, our protocol design has the legitimate user
transmit the DH key exchange message multiple times in a
row, such that a MITM attacker has to jam all these messages,
which will lead to a burst sequence of packet collisions at the
receiver’s antenna1. This abnormal link layer behavior can be
then detected by the detection algorithm at the receiver’s side.
The details of our proposed scheme are designed specifically
for IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks, which is the most
widely used wireless communication standard. However, the
methodology of our solution can be used for designing key
establish protocols for other distributed coordinated contention
based wireless networks, such as 802.15.4 networks. The
contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) We systematically study the MITM attack over wireless
networks, and model the attacker’s behavior on the link
layer.
2) We propose a key establishment protocol based on the
DH key exchange, and its corresponding channel access
mechanism. The proposed protocol forces a successful
MITM attacker to cause consecutive packet collisions at
the link layer.
3) We design an attacker detection algorithm, which can
distinguish the consecutive packet collision introduced
by the MITM attacker from normal packet collisions.
4) We evaluate the performance of our proposed solution
through both theoretical analysis and simulation. The
proposed solution has 0 missed detection ratio and can
achieve an arbitrarily low false positive ratio.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related
works are briefly reviewed in section II. Section III presents
the adversary model and the attacks behavior model. The
proposed key establishment protocol and the attacker detection
mechanism is introduced in section IV. Section V and section
VI show the performance of the proposed solution through
theoretical analysis as well as numerical and simulation re-
sults. We discuss the impersonation attack in section VII and
conclude this paper in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Establishing a shared secret key over a public channel can be
achieved using a cryptographic method such as the DH key ex-
change [1]. However, running the standard DH key exchange
protocol over a public channel is vulnerable to the MITM
attack. Many research efforts have been devoted to developing
device pairing protocols, which usually leverage OoB channels
to provide the mutual authentication required to prevent the
MITM attack. The OoB channel is assumed to possess certain
security properties, for example, it is only accessible by the
1In this paper, we use “packet” to generally mean a chunk of information
delivered over the network. We use “packet”, “message”, and “link-layer
frame” interchangeably, for the convenience of presentation. In our protocol,
each message is carried by a single link-layer frame.
legitimate users, which helps verify the message source. Over
the past decades, there has been many research focusing on
optimizing the computation and communication cost of the
pairing protocol, as well as utilizing different forms of OoB
channels to improve the user-friendliness during the pairing
process [8]–[15].
OoB channels usually require non-trivial human effort and
advance user interfaces. Typical OoB channels used in device
pairing includes but not limited to: hardware port and extra
cable [16]; visual channels such as device screen [14], [17],
LED lighting [18]; audio channels such as speaker and mi-
crophone [19]. There are new out-of-band channels emerging
with the sensing modalities in advanced smart devices, for
example, synchronized drawing [20], shaking together [21].
There are also methods which exploit the shared environmental
context, such as the lightening and sound, to verify the near
proximity of the involved devices [22], [23]. Again, these
solutions require additional sensing modalities that are not
available to all devices, and cannot prevent a nearby MITM
attacker that sharing the same physical context.
There are a few attempts to develop in-band solutions for
initial trust establishment [5]–[7]. The insight of these solu-
tions is similar to the I-Code technique [4], which protects the
integrity of the message payload by modulating the message
signal with Manchester coded ON/OFF keying. Specifically,
in [5], the author designed a tamper-evident announcement
(TEA) message format which improves the performance and
fixed the security vulnerability of the I-codes by introducing
an exceptional long synchronization packet to guarantee an
adversary cannot hide the fact that a TEA message is being
transmitted. However, the solution in [5] relies on the push
button configuration to provide authentication, which in fact
is an OoB channel. [6] proposed an in-band solution for trust
establishment among multiple users, which can compare mul-
tiple authentication strings at the same time. [7] developed a
group key establishment protocol for 802.15.4 based network,
in which message self-authentication is achieved by combining
the I-code integrity guarantee property and the transmission
pre-scheduling function of the 802.15.4 superframe structure.
However, it relies on the assumption that there exists a
trustable coordinator. Besides, these I-Code solutions require
modification to the physical layer signal modulation method.
In this paper, we propose a novel link layer solution for
wireless device pairing. Compared to the existing solutions,
our method works completely in-band and does not require any
human interaction or special hardware. Besides, the implemen-
tation cost of our solution is minimal: no modification to the
device’s physical layer transmission mechanism is involved,
and a user only needs to configure its backoff counter during
the key establishment process.
III. MITM ATTACK MODELING IN 802.11 BASED
NETWORK
In this section, we will introduce our adversary model, and
model the attacker’s behavior for the wireless MITM attack
on the message level. We will present the best strategy for the
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(a) The Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
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(b) The MITM attack scenario.
Fig. 1: The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and the
MITM attack scenario.
MITM attacker in an 802.11 based wireless network. We will
also describe our system model and problem statement.
A. MITM Attack in Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
The DH key exchange allows two parties that have no prior
knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared secret
key over a public insecure channel. As shown in Fig. 1a, the
DH key exchange protocol works as follows: Assume Alice
and Bob agree on a large prime p and a finite cyclic group G
of order n with a generator g. Alice randomly picks a secret
value a (0 ≤ a ≤ p − 1) and calculates ga mod p, and Bob
randomly picks a secret random value b (0 ≤ b ≤ p − 1)and
calculates gb mod p. Then Alice and Bob exchange their
value of ga and gb (all values are mod p unless otherwise
specified). At the last stage, Alice calculates KA = (ga)b and
Bob calculates KB = (gb)a. Both Alice and Bob will arrive
at the same secret value K since (ga)b = (gb)a.
Although the DH key exchange is secure against passive
attackers (eavesdroppers), as is well know, it is vulnerable
to the MITM attack. Since the message transmission is con-
ducted over a public channel, and there is no pre-shared
secret between Alice and Bob, the received ga and gb cannot
be authenticated. In the MITM attack scenario, the attacker
intercepts the legitimate messages and forges fake ones. For
example, as shown in Fig. 1b, the attacker intercepts the
message ga, and sends ga
′
to Bob pretending himself to be
Alice. The attacker will also intercept gb and forge a gb
′
. As
a result, the attacker establishes two secret keys with Alice
and Bob respectively, while Alice and Bob think they have
established a shared secret key with each other.
B. Adversary Model in Wireless Communication
The above-mentioned MITM attack is easy to be imple-
mented in wired communications, since the attacker may get
physical access to the communication cables and then intercept
or manipulate the message signal without being noticed by
the receiver. However, it is not the case in wireless commu-
nications. In wireless communication, message transmissions
take place over the open shared wireless medium, and it is
impossible for the attacker to take full control of the wireless
channel. As a result, some common attacker vectors such as
message interception and message modification are extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to be practically implemented
in wireless communications. Although designing a system
with an overestimation of the attacker’s capabilities does not
harm its security performance, it usually makes the solutions
overcomplicated by introducing unnecessary communication
and computational overhead or make the hardware setup more
costly. The attacker model of any communication system
should base on a realistic assessment of the system vulner-
abilities and attacker capabilities.
The most commonly used, which is also the strongest
attacker model is the Dolev-Yao model [3], in which the
attacker has the capability to eavesdrop, modify, compose,
and replay any messages transmitted and received by legit-
imate devices. In this model, in addition to eavesdropping
and insertion, the attacker can fully modify and annihilate
signals at the receiver’s antenna. [24] systematically in-
vestigated the applicability of the Dolev-Yao model in the
wireless communication system. Based on their theoretical
analysis and simulation, in the worst case (best case for
the attacker), the attacker has a low chance (13.5%-25%) to
deterministically flip a single bit (which is much more easier
than arbitrarily manipulating an ongoing message), and can
covertly annihilate a signal without being detected by existing
energy-based jamming detection countermeasures. However,
the worse case scenario requires the attacker to be able to
measure distances and estimate the channel with high precision
to any target node, and be able to achieve perfect carrier phase
synchronization and precisely control the signal amplitude
levels at the target receiver. In a real-world wireless network,
where nodes communicate over time-varying fading channels,
the state information of the sender-receiver channel is not
available to the attacker, and carrier phase synchronization and
amplitude control at the target receiver is not possible. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no existing techniques which
can practically manipulate or annihilate an ongoing wireless
message. We can safely assume that in realistic settings,
deterministic message modification and message annihilation
is not achievable even for the strongest attacker.
In this paper, we consider a strong but realistic adversary
model. We assume the attacker can eavesdrop and replay
legitimate wireless messages, and he can insert messages at
arbitrary times. The attacker has access to the state-of-art RF
techniques such as beamforming, and can spatial selectivity
transmit or jam signals to one particular target. The only
limitation of the attacker is that he cannot arbitrarily manipu-
late an ongoing wireless message, neither can he annihilate
an ongoing wireless message to the noise level. Here we
do not consider that an attacker utilizes the capture effect
to manipulate a message, since a significantly overpowered
signal transmitted by the attacker can be detected by applying
a received signal strength threshold at the legitimate users.
C. Wireless MITM Attacker Behavior Modeling
As we mentioned before, to successfully launch the MITM
attack during the DH key exchange process, the attacker has to
intercept ga and replace it with ga
′
without being noticed by
Alice and Bob. Based on the previously discussed realistic
attacker model, the best the attacker can do is to send a
jamming signal at the same time when Alice transmits ga,
resulting in a packet collision at Bob’s receiver, such that
Bob cannot decode the message ga from Alice. This can be
achieved by either jamming the complete message or jamming
only the message preamble [24]. After jamming the original
ga, the attacker then has to forge a ga
′
using Alice’s identity
criteria (usually Alice’s IP address and MAC address) and
sends it to Bob. At Bob’s point of view, the failure of decoding
the original message seems to be caused by normal packet
collision, which is quite often in a random access based
wireless network, such as 802.11 based and 802.15.4 based
wireless networks. Bob will accept the forged ga
′
as the
legitimate message from Alice since there is no authentication
mechanism. The attacker then performs the same strategy to
gb and successfully launched the MITM attack. The attack
scenario is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Based on the behavior order of the attacker, here we can
further categorize the MITM attack into two categories. If the
attacker follows the order of 1-2-3-4 as illustrated in Fig. 2,
we define this type of attack as Type I attack. However, the
attacker can also conduct the MITM attack by performing
steps 1-4-2-3. In this case, the attacker first impersonates Bob
to establish a shared key with Alice, then impersonates Alice
to establish a shared key with Bob. In this paper, we term the
second type of attack as Type II attack.
ga
gb
Alice Bob
Attacker
ga’gb’
①
②
③
④
jam
forge
transmission
Fig. 2: Wireless MITM attack scenario.
It is worth noting that for the transmission of the inserted
messages ga
′
and gb
′
, the attacker has to use directional
antenna such that the party being impersonated cannot receive
the message signal, otherwise the attack will be detected with
minor efforts: Alice and Bob can keep monitoring the channel,
and raise an alarm if they see any packet being transmitted is
using their own IP and MAC addresses.
Now let’s consider a real-world application scenario, where
Alice and Bob communicate via an IEEE 802.11 based WiFi
network. In 802.11 based wireless networks, after successively
receiving a data packet, the receiver replies to the sender
with an acknowledgment frame (ACK) to indicate the correct
reception. In this case, if ga is jammed by the attacker,
Bob will not correctly decode this message, thus Alice will
not receive the corresponding ACK. After ACK TIMEOUT,
Alice will try to retransmit the message, until a maximum
retransmission counter is reached. If the attacker keeps jam-
ming all the retransmission from Alice, Alice will notice the
abnormal behavior of the wireless channel and may stop trying
to establish the secret key with Bob. If the attacker ignores
Alice’s retransmission of ga and still forges his ga
′
, Bob
will receive both key exchange messages, which indicates the
existence of the attacker. In both cases, the MITM attack will
not succeed. The best strategy for the attacker is after jamming
ga, he forges an ACK to make Alice believe that the message
ga has been received correctly by Bob, then the attacker can
forge a ga
′
and send it to Bob. However, after receiving the
forged ga
′
, Bob will send an ACK, and the reply address of
this ACK will be Alice’s MAC address. The attacker has to
jam this ACK to prevent Alice from receiving double ACKs
for only one message transmission.
We present the attacker’s best strategy using Fig. 3. In
summary, to successfully launch the MITM attack in an 802.11
based wireless network with ACK mechanism, the attacker has
to follow the 8 steps illustrated in Fig. 3. A Type I attacker
will follow the orders of 1-8 and a Type II attacker will follow
the steps of 1-2-7-8-3-4-5-6.
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Fig. 3: MITM attack in 802.11 based network.
D. System Model and Problem Statement
We consider a one-hop wireless ad hoc network in which
Alice and Bob communicate with each other via an IEEE
802.11 based wireless connection. Assume that Alice and Bob
have already gone through an association handshake, in which
Alice sends the association request and Bob replies with an
association reply to set up the wireless link between them.
Immediately after the association handshake, Alice and Bob
try to establish a shared secret key by a DH key exchange.
Suppose Alice initializes the key exchange protocol. During
the DH key exchange process, an attacker with capabilities
defined in section 3.2 may try to launch the MITM attack,
whose best strategy has been analyzed and illustrated in
section 3.3. Besides Alice, Bob and the attacker, there are
n (n ≥ 0) other wireless stations sharing the same wireless
channel. We assume that Alice and Bob have no data packets
to transmit other than the messages related to the key exchange
protocol, while other wireless stations have data traffic which
can be treated as background traffic to the key exchange
process. All the background wireless stations access the wire-
less channel according to the distributed coordination function
(DCF) specified in IEEE 802.11 standards. We assume the
channel quality is perfect, i.e., the bit error rate is 0. We
further assume that the n background stations are within the
transmission and receiving range of Alice and Bob (no hidden
terminals), and their network traffic density is stable.
Based on the above system model and assumptions, in this
paper, we aim at addressing the following problem: How can
Alice and Bob prevent or detect the MITM attack during their
key exchange process while using only in-band channel? We
consider the attacker as being detected if both Alice and Bob
detect its presence. We are seeking practical solutions that
are easy to be implemented, and require no modification to
existing wireless hardware. In this paper, we do not consider
the denial of service (DoS) attack in which the attacker only
prevents Alice and Bob from agreeing on the same key, since
this can be easily achieved by keep jamming the wireless
channel.
IV. AN IN-BAND SECURE KEY ESTABLISHMENT
PROTOCOL
A. Overview of the Proposed Solution
The insight of our solution is as follows. From the at-
tacker’s behavior analysis in section 3, we notice that in order
to prevent Alice or Bob receiving legitimate key exchange
messages, the attacker has to transmit jamming signals to
intentionally collide the legitimate messages at the receiver’s
antenna. This deterministic packet collision introduced by
the attacker can be observed by the receiver. To distinguish
the packet collision introduced by the MITM attacker from
normal packet collisions due to simultaneous transmission,
our protocol requires Alice to transmit ga multiple times
consecutively, such that to successfully launch the MITM
attack, the attacker has to jam all the ga from Alice, thus
resulting in a burst sequence of packet collisions at Bob’s
receiver. Then Bob can notice this abnormal channel behavior
and detect the existence of the attacker. We will achieve this
by modifying the DH key exchange protocol and the channel
access scheme for the protocol message transmission, as well
as carefully designing an attacker detection mechanism.
B. Preliminary: 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function
(DCF)
In this subsection, we briefly describe the main procedures
in the DCF of 802.11 MAC protocol, which is a carrier
sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA)
mechanism. In the 802.11 MAC protocol, a station with a
packet to transmit should first monitor the channel before
transmitting. If the channel is sensed to be idle for a period
of time equals to a distributed interframe space (DIFS), then
the station selects a random backoff counter. The backoff
counter is uniformly selected from [0, CW ], with CW being
its current contention window size. The station decreases its
backoff counter by 1 for each time slot when the channel is
sensed idle after the DIFS. If the channel is sensed to be busy
during the backoff procedure, the station will freeze its backoff
counter until the end of current transmission, and reactivate
the backoff counter until the channel is sensed idle again for
more than a DIFS time period. The station transmits when its
backoff counter reaches 0. A packet collision happens when
more than one stations have their backoff counter reaching
zero at the same time slot and transmit simultaneously.
In the CSMA/CA mechanism, a station does not have the
capability to detect the collision of its own transmission, so
an ACK is transmitted by the receiver station to indicate the
successful packet reception. The ACK is transmitted after
a period of time equals to a short interframe space (SIFS)
immediately follows the successful reception. Since the SIFS
is shorter than the DIFS, no other stations are able to transmit
until the transmission of the current ACK finishes. In other
words, the transmission of the ACK always has a higher
priority compared to normal data packet transmission. If a
station does not receive an ACK within a time period of
ACK TIMEOUT after it transmits a packet, it knows that
its previous transmission has failed. Each time a transmis-
sion fails, the contention window size of this station CW
doubles its value before it reaches a maximum upper limit
CWmax = 2
βCWmin, and remains to be this value until
the maximum retransmission limit α is reached. When the
maximum retransmission limit is reached, CW will be reset
to CWmin and the current data packet will be discarded.
C. The Proposed Key Exchange Protocol
As we mentioned, the insight of our solution is to let Alice
and Bob transmit the DH key exchange message multiple
times. In order to successfully launch the MITM attack, the
attacker has to jam all these parameters at the receiver’s
antenna, resulting in a burst sequence of packet collisions
such that the receiver can distinguish this abnormal channel
behavior from normal packet collision. The modified DH key
exchange protocol is illustrated in Fig. 4. We use Mai and M
b
i
denote the ith message from Alice and Bob, respectively; the
superscript is dropped when we generally indicate a message
from either Alice or Bob.
In the modified DH key exchange protocol, each key
exchange message is transmitted m times. In this situation,
to successfully perform the MITM attack, the attacker has to
ga
Alice Bob
.
.
.
ga
ga
ACK
ACK
ACK
ACK
ACK
gb
gb
.
.
.
m rounds of ga
m rounds of gb
Ma1:
Ma2:
Mam:
Mbm:
Mb1:
Fig. 4: The proposed key exchange protocol.
block all these 2m messages by introducing 2m extra packet
collisions to the channel, and Alice and Bob can each observe
m packet collisions. The value of m shall be determined based
on the current channel condition, which will be discussed in
later sections of this paper.
We set the message format for Mi as follows:
Mi = { i | m | ga ( or gb ) | dummy data},
where i denotes the current message number and m denotes
the total number of messages (rounds) in the key exchange
protocol. ga or gb is the same as the original DH protocol.
We use dummy data to fill the message payload to be the
maximum size allowed in IEEE 802.11 standard (typical value
being 2304 Bytes). The reason we use dummy data to reach the
maximum frame size is to prevent the attacker jamming more
than one packets by sending one exceptionally long jamming
signal. For example, if m = 2, and the length of each Mi is
only 500 Bytes, our goal is to let the receiver observe 2 packet
collisions when an attacker presents. In this scenario, if the
attacker uses one single jamming signal whose duration can
cover part of the transmission of M1 plus at least the packet
header of M2, the receiver will only observe one collision
event. If we set the packet size of the key exchange protocol
to be the maximum size allowed in the 802.11 standards, when
the receiver observes a collision whose duration is longer
than the transmission time of a maximum-sized packet, it
will notice this abnormal channel behavior. We term a packet
collision with a duration longer than the time required to
transmit a maximum-sized packet as an exceptionally long
packet collision.
Fig. 5 illustrates the reason why we use dummy data to
fill up the message payload to reach the maximum packet
size allowed. In Fig. 5a, Alice transmits ga two times with-
out adding dummy data, and the attacker jams the message
with one jamming signal. In this case Bob will detect one
collision event. If the two packet transmission duration plus
Ma1
Collision
Alice
Bob
Attacker
Ma2
Jamming
Seems to be a normal collision
(a) Small packet size.
Ma1
Collision
Alice
Bob
Attacker
Jamming
Ma2
Longer than normal collision
(b) The attacker uses one jamming signal to jam two packets.
Ma1
Collision
Alice
Bob
Attacker
Jamming
Ma2
2 collisions
Collision
Jamming
(c) The attakcer uses two jamming signals.
Fig. 5: Use maximum packet size for protocol message trans-
mission.
their inter-frame space is less than the transmission time
of one maximum-sized packet, this will seem to be one
normal packet collision for Bob. In Fig. 5b, Alice transmits
ga with dummy data added, and the attacker tries to jam
the message transmission with only one jamming signal. In
this case, Bob will be able to observe a collision longer than
normal packet transmission, thus detect the existence of the
attacker. If the attacker wants to jam the maximum-sized key
exchange message without being detected by the collision
duration criteria, he has to jam each message separately, as
shown in Fig. 5c. In summary, with dummy data added to
the key exchange messages, if the attacker attempts to prevent
Bob from receiving Alice’s key exchange messages, Bob is
guaranteed to observe m packet collisions. The same is true
for the key exchange messages from Bob to Alice.
Our proposed key exchange protocol guarantees that if the
attacker wants to successfully launch the MITM attack, both
Alice and Bob will be able to observe m extra packet colli-
sions. The remaining problem is how to distinguish these extra
packet collisions introduced by the attacker from normal ones
caused by simultaneous transmissions, since packet collision
frequently happens due to the distributed nature of the channel
access mechanism: if the backoff counters of two or more
stations happen to reach 0 at the same time slot, a packet
collision will occur. In fact, every station within the wireless
network shares equal chance to access the wireless channel.
Suppose Alice and Bob share the channel with n other stations,
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Fig. 6: Channel behavior of the proposed scheme.
then on average Alice has to wait for n packet transmission
before it gets a chance to transmit a single protocol message.
This implies that in presence of the attacker, on average
Bob can only observe one extra collision for every n + 1
packet transmissions, which cannot serve as a good detection
criterion.
Our goal is to let Alice or Bob distinguish the extra packet
collisions introduced by the attacker from normal packet ones.
To achieve this, we can grant the key exchange protocol pack-
ets a higher priority to access the wireless channel compared
to regular data packets, such that the extra packet collisions
introduced by the attacker will not be diluted by normal
collisions.
As we introduced in section 4.2, the backoff counter of a
station only starts to decrease after the channel is idle for at
least DIFS, and a station can only transmit if its backoff timer
reaches 0. If we let the key exchange messages access the
channel without going through the backoff process by fixing
the backoff counter to be 0, message Mai and M
b
i will have
priority over the background data packets.
The channel access scheme for the proposed key exchange
protocol is as follows. Upon receiving the ACK of Ma(i−1),
Alice will transmit Mai (2 ≤ i ≤ m) immediately after a DIFS,
and upon receiving the ACK of M b(i−1), Bob will transmit M
b
i
(2 ≤ i ≤ m) immediately after an DIFS. The channel access
scheme for Ma1 and M
b
1 follow the normal backoff mechanism
defined in the 802.11 standards.
This channel access scheme for the proposed key exchange
protocol guarantees the channel access priority for message
Mai and M
b
i (2 ≤ i ≤ m). Only Ma1 and M b1 compete for the
channel with the other stations. There is a probability that the
transmission of Ma1 and M
b
1 encounters a collision, but the
other messages in the key exchange protocol are guaranteed
to be collision-free. More importantly, this channel access
scheme forces the MITM attacker to consecutively collide
multiple packets, such that the receiver can distinguish these m
consecutive packet collisions from normal ones, thus detecting
the presence of the attacker. Fig. 6 illustrates the channel
behavior of the proposed key exchange protocol with this
priority channel access scheme.
Fig. 6a shows the channel behavior of the proposed key ex-
change protocol under normal conditions (without the MITM
attacker). Besides Alice and Bob, there are other stations
trying to access the wireless channel. Alice starts the key
exchange protocol by transmitting Ma1 after winning the
channel competition. Other stations (station i as an example)
can only get access to compete for the channel after the
transmission of Mam finishes, because M
a
i (2 ≤ i ≤ m)
is transmitted immediately after a DIFS, and they have no
chance to decrease their backoff counters. Fig. 6b illustrates
the channel behavior of the proposed key exchange protocol
when a Type II attacker presents. The figure only shows
the first half of the attack, where the attacker jams all the
Mai from Alice and then forges M
a′
i to Bob. The attacker’s
behavior results in m consecutive packet collisions at Bob’s
receiver, which only happens with extremely low probability
under normal conditions. The attacker can be then detected
by our detection mechanisms (which will be introduced later).
The second half of the attack (not included in Fig. 6b due
to space limitations) will be the attacker jamming the M bi
and forging M b
′
i to Alice, which will result in m consecutive
packet collisions at Alice’s receiver.
D. System Design
1) Design Principles: Given the proposed key exchange
protocol and the proposed channel access scheme, the MITM
attack detection algorithm design is fairly simple. The key
insight for the detection algorithm design can be summarized
into the following two points:
1) if the attacker jams all the key exchange messages from
Alice (or Bob), then Bob (or Alice) will observe m
consecutive packet collisions.
2) if the attacker fails to jam all the key exchange messages
from Alice (or Bob), and still try to forge an Ma
′
i (or
M b
′
i ), then Bob (or Alice) will receive key exchange
messages containing different parameters ga and ga
′
(or
gb and gb
′
).
Base on these insights, we design our system flowchart as
illustrated in Fig. 7. Before we get into the details, let’s first
introduce in practice how does one station determine whether
an ongoing transmission is a collision.
2) Detecting a packet collision: In 802.11 wireless net-
work, a station keeps monitoring the channel. Whenever the
station’s antenna detects an ongoing packet transmission, it
will first decode the physical herder and the MAC header, and
obtain the Destination Address (DA) which is contained in the
MAC header. If the DA does not match its own MAC address,
the station will drop the packet without attempting to decode
the data payload. If the station is the designated receiver of
this packet, it will continue decoding the packet data payload.
If the packet can be decoded and passes the FCS check (error-
detecting code), the station will send an ACK to indicate the
correct reception of the packet. If the packet header or the
packet payload cannot be decoded or the FCS check fails, the
station will consider this packet has collided and no ACK will
be transmitted.
Theoretically, we can have Alice and Bob attempting to
decode all the received packets, no matter whether the DA
matches or not. This way Alice and Bob can detect the packet
collisions within their antenna’s receiving range. However, this
method will impose huge energy consumption and shorten the
lifetime of energy-restricted wireless devices. Besides, if the
attacker jams the preamble of a message, the receiver will not
even notice that there is an ongoing message (as synchroniza-
tion will fail). In this paper, we will adopt a channel collision
detection method which considers the preamble jamming and
is an energy-efficient. We notice that from an observer’s point
of view, in case of a successful packet transmission happens,
the channel occupancy follows the pattern
Busy with duration > ACK
=⇒ Idle with duration = SIFS
=⇒ Busy with duration = ACK,
and in case of a packet collision, the channel occupancy
follows the pattern
Busy with duration > ACK =⇒ Idle with duration > SIFS.
In our proposed scheme, Alice and Bob will use these channel
occupancy patterns to determine whether an ongoing packet
transmission is a successful one or a collision.
3) Flowchart of the proposed system: Now let’s go through
the details of the proposed system. The very first step will
be Alice and Bob establish their wireless link through an
association handshake. Assume Alice is always the one who
initiates the association handshake and the key exchange
process. The system flowchart for Alice and Bob are slightly
different. Lets first introduce the system process for Alice,
which is shown by the left part of Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7: System flowchart.
After receiving the association request, Alice starts a key
exchange timer T (step 1). Alice will only install the estab-
lished key after T expires and no attacker detected. Then Alice
monitors the channel for a time period of t before starting to
transmit Ma1 . This time period of t is termed as the monitoring
window. During the monitoring window, Alice estimates the
channel condition (channel collision probability and channel
traffic density) and decides the number of rounds m for the
proposed key exchange protocol (step 2). The details of how
to chose a proper m will be discussed in the next section.
With m being decided, Alice can start the key exchange
protocol by transmitting Ma1 to M
a
m according to the proposed
channel access scheme. After finishing the transmission, Alice
starts to monitor the channel and receiving M bi (step 3).
The attacker detection decision making will begin after Alice
received all the M bi (step 4). She will check if there are m
consecutive packet collisions between step 3 and step 4, if
there are exceptionally long packet collisions, and whether the
received gb are all equal. A Type I attacker will be detected
at this point. If no attacker detected at this point, Alice still
needs to monitor the channel until the key exchange timer T
expires (step 5) to decide whether a TypeII attacker exists.
After T expires, if no m consecutive packet collision and no
exceptionally long packet collision has been detected, Alice
can confirm that there is no MITM attack during the key
exchange process and install the established key.
Now we describe the system flowchart for Bob. Upon
receiving the association request from Alice, Bob transmits the
association reply and starts his key exchange timer T (step 1).
Bob will start to monitor the channel after a time period of t
(step 2), since during this time Alice is estimating the channel
condition and has not started the key exchange protocol yet.
After receiving all Mai from Alice (step 3), Bob checks if the
timer T expires, if all the received ga are equal, and if there
are m consecutive packet collisions or any exceptionally long
packet collision. Both the Type I attacker and the Type II
attacker will be detected by these detection criteria. If there is
no attacker being detected, Bob can start transmitting his M bi .
After Bob finishes the transmission of M bm, he can install the
established key.
E. Alternative Designs
1) Channel access mechanism: In the proposed solution,
the protocol messages are transmitted immediately after a
DIFS, without going through the back off process. This
channel access mechanism aims at granting Alice or Bob
continuously channel access during the protocol message
transmission. In fact, this can be achieved by setting the inter-
message space to be any value between SIFS and DIFS.
We choose DIFS in our design for the purpose of easy
implementation: Alice or Bob only need to change the backoff
counter configuration in the key establishment stage.
2) Detector design: Given the channel access mechanism,
the channel occupancy of the protocol messages has a unique
pattern: the ACK of the previous message is followed by
an idle period of DIFS and then a maximum-sized packet
transmission. Correspondingly, if the attacker jams all the
key exchange messages, the receiver will observe m con-
secutive collisions with a fixed idle interval which equals to
SIFS+ACK+DIFS. Based on this collision pattern, we can
design a more advanced detector to distinguish this attacker
behavior from normal packet collisions. Specifically, a timer
can be added on top of the current detector design to record the
timestamp for recent collisions, and if consecutive collisions
are detected, the users can compare the timestamps to check
if the idle intervals match the unique pattern. Compared to
the current design, this more advanced detector can achieve 0
false positive ratio with the extra cost of memory space for
recording the collision timestamps and extra codes to check
the collision pattern. We we suggest the current solution in this
paper for better performance and cost trade-off. In next section,
we will show that the current detector design is sufficient and
can achieve an arbitrarily low false positive ratio.
3) RTS/CTS mode: The details of our solution are designed
for the basic access mode in 802.11 wireless network. Besides
the basic access mode, there is an RTS/CTS mode aiming
at addressing the hidden terminal problem, in which each
station goes through a request-to-send (RTS) and clear-to-send
(CTS) handshake before the data packet transmission [25].
The proposed solution can be further extended to cover the
RTS/CTS mode. In the RTS/CTS mode, only the RTS packet
has a chance to collide with other RTS packets, while the data
packet is collision-free. If the attacker only collides the data
packet, the detection becomes trivial, so a successful attacker
has to jam the CTS request. Base on this insight, we can have
Alice transmit the RTS request m times consecutively using
the proposed channel access mechanism, such that the attacker
has to jam all the m RTS to cause m consecutive collisions,
which can then be detected by Bob.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED
SOLUTION
In this section, we conduct theoretical performance analysis
of the proposed system in terms of missed detection ratio,
false positive ratio and the cost of applying our solution. The
proposed system has 0 missed detection ratio, and can achieve
an arbitrarily low false positive ratio by proper parameter
configuration.
A. Missed Detection Ratio
The missed detection ratio is defined as the probability that
an attacker successfully launched the MITM attack without
being detected by Alice or Bob. With the proposed scheme, a
MITM attacker will always be detected. The missed detection
ratio of the proposed scheme is 0.
The MITM attack is considered to be successful, only if the
attacker can establish two separate shared keys with Alice and
Bob, while passing all the detection criteria in the proposed
scheme. The proposed scheme has three detection rules: (1)
all received ga (gb) are equal; (2) no m consecutive packet
collision is detected; (3) no exceptionally long packet collision
is detected. In the proposed scheme, Alice will transmit ga m
times. If the attacker does not intercept all these m messages,
Bob will at least receive one ga from Alice. In this case, if
the attacker transmits his own ga
′ 6= ga to Bob, according
to detection rule (1), Bob will detect his presence. The only
successful chance for the attacker is that he manages to
intercept all the ga from Alice. Under the adversary model,
the attacker can only achieve this by colliding these messages
at Bob’s antenna. If the attacker uses one jamming signal to
collide multiple Mai , an exceptionally long packet collision
will be observed by Bob, as illustrated in Fig. 5, which violates
detection rule (3). The attacker has to individually collide
these m packets. According to the proposed channel access
mechanism, these m packets will be transmitted consecutively
without being interrupted by normal background data packets,
so colliding them will result in m consecutive packet colli-
sions at Bob’s receiver, which violates detection rule (2). In
summary, under the adversary model defined in section 3.2, a
MITM attacker can always be detected by our detection rules.
The missed detection ratio of the proposed scheme is 0.
B. False Positive Ratio
A false positive occurs when the proposed system detects
an attacker but in fact no threat exists. Our system will raise
an alarm if any of the following situations occurs: (1) the
received ga (gb) does not match; (2) Alice or Bob detects
m consecutive packet collisions within the detection window
(the time period starts after the monitoring window until the
key exchange timer T expires); (3) an exceptionally long
packet collision is detected. Given the assumption that the
channel quality is perfect (bit error equals 0) and there are
no hidden terminals, if there is no attacker existing, situation
(1) and (3) will not happen. A false positive will only occur
under the circumstance that within the detection window, there
exist m consecutive packet collisions due to simultaneous
transmissions.
First, we present the mathematical model for the consecutive
collision detector. Let In be the indicator denoting the state
of the nth observed packet transmission. Specifically,
In =
{
1, the nth packet is a collision,
0, the nth packet is a successful transmission.
We use Xn to denote the state of the detector, then the behavior
of the detector can be mathematically described as{
Xn+1 = In × (Xn + In)
X0 = 0.
(1)
With m being the detection threshold, the decision rule of the
detector in step n is
δn =
{
1 if Xn ≥ m
0 if Xn < m,
where δn is an indicator of whether m consecutive collisions
happen or not. The detector value Xn will be reset to 0 as soon
as it exceeds the threshold m and the detection procedure starts
over again.
Consider the sequence {Xn} as a discrete random process,
which takes values from a finite set A = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m}.
The detector is said to be in state i at step n if Xn = i with
i ∈ A. The state transition happens when a packet transmission
over the wireless channel is observed. According to (1), the
next state Xn+1 depends only on the current state Xn and is
independent of any other previous states, where the transition
probability is
Pij = P{Xn+1 = j | Xn = i} i, j ∈ A.
Thus, the random process {Xn} satisfies the Markov property
and can be modeled as a discrete-time Markov chain.
Given the decision threshold m, the Markov chain then can
be described by the (m+ 1)× (m+ 1) transition probability
matrix: 
P00 P01 . . . P0m
P10 P11 . . . P1m
...
...
. . .
...
Pm0 Pm1 . . . Pmm

Let pch denote the channel collision probability, which is
the probability that an observed packet transmission is a
collision. Assuming the collision probability of each observed
transmission is independent, then we have
Pij =

pch j = i+ 1 and 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
1− pch j = 0 and 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
1 j = 0 and i = m
0 otherwise.
(2)
The state of the detector can only transit from state i to state
i+1 (0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1), or from state i to state 0 (0 ≤ i ≤ m).
The state transition diagram of the proposed detector is shown
in Fig. 8.
0 1 2 mpch pch pch pch...
1-pch
1-pch
1
1-pch
1-pch m-1
Fig. 8: Detector station transition diagram.
Let (pi0, pi1, . . . , pim) denote the steady-state probabilities
of the Markov chain. (pi0, pi1, . . . , pim) can be solved from the
following equations:
pij =
m∑
i=0
piiPij , j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}
m∑
j=0
pij = 1.
(3)
With equations (2) and (3), we can derive the close-form
expression for pim as
pim =
pmch − pm+1ch
1− pm+1ch
. (4)
The detector will raise an alarm when it reaches state m.
Under normal situations where no attacker is in presence, if
the detector reaches state m during the detection window, a
false positive occurs. The false positive ratio (denoted as Pfp)
of the proposed system is determined by the channel collision
probability pch, the number of messages m in the proposed
key exchange protocol, as well as the number of packet
transmission observed in the detection window. Assume there
are total k transmissions observed in the detection window,
then Pfp can be derived as
Pfp = kpim = k · p
m
ch − pm+1ch
1− pm+1ch
. (5)
From equation (5), we can see that given k and pch, the false
positive ratio of the proposed system monotonically decreases
with m increases. So we can always choose a large enough m
to reach an arbitrarily low target false positive ratio. It is worth
noting that in implementation, pch and k will be estimated
based on the transmission observed during the monitoring
window t (step 2 of Fig. 7) and may not be the exact
packet collision probability for the transmissions observed
during the detection window. Besides, equation (5) is derived
under the assumption that the collision probability for each
observed transmission is independent. So when implementing
our system, the value of m should be selected conservatively.
C. Cost Analysis
The cost introduced by applying the proposed solution
has two aspects. First, the repeat transmission of the DH
protocol message introduces extra communication overhead.
Second, the shared key is considered to be valid at the end
of the detection window, which results in a delay to the key
establishment process.
The proposed solution repeats the DH protocol m times,
which has 2(m − 1) more message transmission compared
to the original DH protocol. Typically, the key agreement
protocol is only used for initial trust establishment, and the
subsequent key updates can be performed based on the existing
shared secret. So the communication overhead of the proposed
solution is in fact a one-time cost. From the numerical results
in the next section, we can see that even at an extremely busy
channel condition, the required value of m to achieve a 1%
false positive ratio is no larger than 10.
The delay introduced by the proposed solution equals to
the key exchange timer T . T consists of two windows: the
channel monitoring window t and the detection window T −t.
The channel monitoring window is for Alice to estimate
the channel collision probability and determine a value m
for the key agreement protocol, and the detection window
should be large enough to cover the 2m protocol message
transmission. The value of T and t is preset by Alice. In
practice, we recommend using T = 1.5s and t = 1s, since 1s
monitoring window gives Alice plenty of samples for channel
condition estimation, and a detection window of 0.5s is enough
for transmitting 26 maximum-sized protocol message with
the proposed channel access mechanism under the lowest
possible WiFi data rate (1Mbps). The recommended setting
introduces a 1.5s delay in the key establishment process, which
is satisfactory considering that the required human interaction
in existing OoB device pairing methods usually takes a couple
of seconds.
VI. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical and simulation
results of the proposed system. We first present the simulation
results of our collision detection algorithm, and compare the
simulation results with theoretical analysis to demonstrate that
our collision detection algorithm can precisely detect whether
an observed transmission is a collision or a successful one. We
Bit rate 54Mbps
Slot time 9µs
DIFS 34µs
SIFS 18µs
ACK duration 28µs
Initial backoff window size 32
Maximum backoff stages 6
Maximum retry limit 7
TABLE I: Simulation setup.
then present the numerical and simulation results of the false
positive ratio, and show that the proposed system can achieve
an arbitrarily low false positive ratio. Last but not least, we
demonstrate how to configure the system parameters through
a case study.
In our simulation, Alice, Bob, and multiple background
stations share an 802.11a wireless channel, with physical layer
data rate configured to be OFDM 54Mbps. The packet size of
the background traffic is uniformly distributed between 500
Bytes and 2000 Bytes. The link layer parameters are set to be
the default values in the 802.11a standard. We summarize the
key parameters of the simulation environment in Table I.
A. Channel Collision Probability
The channel collision probability under saturated traffic
condition can be explicitly analyzed using the Markov chain
based models [25], [26]. We can use equation (14) and (17)
in [26] to calculate the channel access probability τ and
the conditionally collision probability p. Then the channel
collision probability pch can be derived as
pch =P{collision | a transmission occurs}
=
P{collision}
P{a transmission occurs}
=
1− (1− τ)n − nτ(1− τ)n−1
1− (1− τ)n (6)
We numerically calculate pch with the number of stations
varies from 2 to 30, and plot the results in Fig. 9. We then
implement the collision detection algorithm proposed in 4.4.2
on a silent node, which only monitors the channel without
transmitting or receiving any packets. This silent node makes
decisions purely based on the channel occupancy pattern it
observed, and count the number of collisions and successful
transmissions within the simulation run time. We plot the
channel collision probability obtained from the silent node
with the number of stations being 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30
in Fig. 9. We can see that the pch obtained by our collision
detection algorithm matches the theoretical analysis with high
precision.
We also implement the collision detection algorithm to
obtain the channel collision probability pch under unsaturated
traffic conditions. To simulate the unsaturated traffic, we
implement a Poisson traffic generator on each background
station. Fig. 10 shows the pch for 5, 15, and 25 stations
under varies traffic densities. As long as the data rate of each
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Fig. 9: Channel collision probability (saturated traffic).
station drops below a certain threshold, we can observe that
pch drastically decreases to a low level.
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Fig. 10: Channel collision probability (unsaturated traffic).
B. False Positive Ratio
As we analyzed in section 5.2, the false positive ratio of
the proposed system is affected by a number of variables,
including the channel collision probability pch, the number of
transmissions being monitored within the detection window, as
well as the number of messages transmitted in the proposed
key exchange protocol m. By equation (5), Pfp will increase
with pch and k increasing, and with m decreasing, which
matches the intuition that these trends will give the normal
packet transmission a better chance to hit m collisions in a
row. The numerical results of Pfp is presented in Fig. 11.
The five surfaces from bottom to top represent the Pfp with
pch being 5%, 10,% 15%, 20%, and 25%, respectively, while k
varying from 1000 to 4000 and m ranging from 4 to 12. When
pch equals 25%, which means the channel is operating in an
extremely busy condition, the proposed system can achieve a
false positive ratio of 1% if m is larger than 10.
We conduct extensive simulations in both saturated and
unsaturated traffic scenarios to examine the false positive ratio
of the proposed system. First, we set 5 stations to generate
saturated traffic, and have one silent node to monitor the
channel and record the consecutive collisions it observed. The
detection window is set to be 0.5 seconds, and on average there
are 1545 transmissions observed in one detection window.
We conduct the simulation 20000 times, and the results are
Fig. 11: False positive ratio.
5 stations detection window: 0.5s simulation run: 20000
m No. alarms Pfp 95% confidence interval
4 446 2.23% (1.76%, 2.70%)
5 17 0.085% (0.007%, 0.177%)
TABLE II: False positive ratio (saturated).
presented in Table II. In this situation, the proposed scheme
can achieve 1% false positive ratio with m = 5. The Pfp
obtained in the simulation is lower than the theoretical result
in equation (5). This is because equation (5) is based on the
assumption that each packet collision is independent. However,
after a collision happens, the involved stations will double their
contention window for the next transmission, so the collision
probability for the next transmission will be smaller. So the
Pfp calculated by equation (5) is in fact an upper bond for
the saturated traffic scenario.
The simulation results for unsaturated traffic is presented
in Table. III. 12 stations are equipped with Poisson traffic
generators with data rate being 1.875Mbps. On average, there
are 1198 transmissions observed during the 0.5s detection
window. The simulation results show that the actual false
positive ratio is higher than the theoretical value calculated
using equation (5). This is due to the fact that under the
unsaturated condition, most of the times only a few stations
simultaneously have packets ready to transmit, resulting in a
low average channel collision probability. However, when a
collision happens, the involved stations will attempt to retrans-
mit their packets, as a result, the number of stations competing
for the next transmission is higher than average, which leads
to a higher than average channel collision probability. So
when implementing our system in an unsaturated condition,
Alice should select m conservatively. We recommend to first
calculate m with Equation (5) to obtain the value required for
a target false positive ratio, then use m + 2 in the proposed
solution for a guaranteed performance.
C. A Case Study
In this subsection, we present a simulation case to demon-
strate how does Alice select the system parameter m based on
the information she observed during the monitoring window,
to achieve a target false positive ratio. In this simulation case,
Alice, Bob, and other 10 background stations are sharing
12 stations 1.875 Mbps simulation run: 20000
m No. alarms Pfp 95% confidence interval
4 932 4.66% (3.99%, 5.33%)
5 126 0.63% (0.38%, 0.88%)
6 15 0.075% (0, 0.16%)
TABLE III: False positive ratio (unsaturated).
an 802.11a wireless channel. Each of the 10 background
stations is generating packets with 2.0 Mbps data rate. The key
exchange timeout T is set to be 1.5 seconds, and the duration
of the monitoring window t is set to be 1 second. Based on
the information observed during t, Alice will decide m, which
is the number of messages to be transmitted in the proposed
key exchange protocol, to reach a target Pfp of 0.5%.
After receiving the association reply from Bob, Alice starts
to monitor the channel for t = 1 second. During this time,
Alice observed 2065 transmission events, among them there
are 1994 successful transmissions and 71 collisions (these
numbers are obtained from a simulation case). Based on these
values, Alice estimates the channel collision probability pch
to be 3.44%, and the number of transmissions in the detection
window (T − t = 0.5 seconds) to be 1033. According to
equation (5), if m equals 4, Pfp is 1.36%, and if m takes
the value 5, Pfp is estimated to be 0.08%, which reaches the
target false positive ratio. As we mentioned earlier, m should
be selected conservatively. So Alice will set m to be 7 and
starts the key exchange protocol.
We conduct simulations for both the normal case and the
MITM attack scenario. We let Alice transmit 7 maximum-
sized packets at the beginning of the detection window with
her backoff counter fixed to 0. The attacker is set to transmit
a jamming packet without channel sensing and backoff pro-
cess, and the transmission of the attacker is triggered when
Alice starts to transmit. In the normal case, during the 0.5
seconds detection window, Bob observes 41 collisions and 996
successful transmissions on the channel, and the maximum
length of consecutive collisions observed is 2. In the attack
case, Bob successfully detects 7 consecutive collisions at the
very beginning of the detection window, which indicates the
presence of the attacker.
VII. DSICUSSION: MITM ATTACK VS IMPERSONATION
ATTACK
The proposed scheme is based on the assumption that Alice
and Bob have already gone through an association handshake
and have a wireless link available between them. However, the
attacker may impersonate Alice or Bob during the association
phase. Specifically, when Alice sends the association request,
the attacker can jam this message and then impersonate
Bob to send a reply to Alice. The proposed scheme covers
the key exchange process after the association, but not the
association phase itself. The essential difference between the
impersonation attack and the MITM attack is that in the latter
case, both Alice and Bob know that a key exchange process is
expected within a certain time window (corresponding to the
key exchange timeout window T in the proposed solution).
However, in the former case, being the passive party in the
association handshake, Bob is not aware of that Alice is trying
to establish a shared key with him.
The proposed solution can work on top of any existing
identity authentication technique, such as the push button
configuration (PBC) mechanism defined in 802.11 standards,
to address the impersonation attack. However, an identity
authentication protocol requires either pre-shared knowledge
or OoB channels. In fact, we can address the impersonation
attack by a similar link layer approach. Due to the space
limitation, here we only introduce the general methodology
for a secure association protocol without going deep into the
detailed design.
In the secure association protocol, Alice transmits the
association request m times, with random delays between
each request, and Bob replies with n association replies
once he receives an association request. The n association
replies will be transmitted using the channel access mechanism
proposed in section 4.3. To successfully impersonate Bob, the
attacker has to jam all the m requests from Alice, otherwise
if Bob receives a single request, the attacker has to jam
the corresponding n replies, which results in n consecutive
collisions at Alice’s side and can be detected by Alice. With
the random delay between the association requests, even if
the attacker knows the exact transmission starting time of the
first request, he does not know the transmission starting time
of the following requests. The best he can do is to examine
the packet header of every transmission on the channel, and
sending a jamming signal when he sees the current packet
is indeed from Alice. If the packet header containing Alice’s
address is perceptible to the attacker, it is also perceptible
to Bob. Based on this insight, Bob can keep monitoring the
channel and keep a record on the source address of collided
transmissions. If the attacker jams all the m requests from
Alice, Bob will notice that m transmissions from the same
address collided consecutively. At this point, Bob sends n
alarm messages using the channel access scheme in section
4.3. If Alice receives an alarm message, she will be aware
of the attacker; if all the alarms are jammed by the attacker,
Alice will observe n consecutive collisions and be aware of
the attacker.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we systematically studied the wireless MITM
attack, and modeled the attacker’s behavior on message level.
We then present a novel in-band solution to detect the attacker
during the key exchange process. The proposed scheme forces
the attacker to generate a burst sequence of consecutive
channel collisions, which can be detected by legitimate parties.
We further present the theoretical analysis as well as the
numerical and simulation results to validate the performance
of the proposed system. Our solution achieves a missed
detection ratio of 0, and can achieve an arbitrary target false
positive ratio by proper parameter design. A case study is
also presented to demonstrate how to configure the system to
achieve a guaranteed performance.
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